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Abstract
Objective—To examine how the retail
environment in which tobacco is sold has
changed because of the slotting fees and
trade promotions paid by the tobacco
companies. Public policy options for deal-
ing with this environment are also
evaluated.
Data sources—A literature review, tel-
ephone interviews, and observation.
Results—The tobacco companies have
been dramatically increasing the volume
of slotting fees and trade promotions they
pay to retailers, creating a more tobacco
friendly retail environment containing self
service displays and ample point-of-sale
advertising. Critics express concern that
these payments have kept prices lower and
more varied than they might be otherwise,
created more opportunities for pilferage
and underage selling, and provided more
youth exposure to tobacco promotions.
Public policy makers could either ban
these payments, institute policies de-
signed to mitigate their harmful eVects, or
leave the situation as it is, relying on
enforcement of existing statutes as well as
market forces to reduce harm. Actions
that might mitigate harmful eVects would
include putting minimum retail prices on
tobacco products, banning self service
displays, requiring retailers to be
licensed, and adding more warning signs
at the point of sale.
Conclusion—Additional research is
needed before determining the most
appropriate public policy stance.
(Tobacco Control 2001;10:340–344)
Keywords: promotion; slotting; retailing;
merchandising
The ways in which tobacco products are
displayed and promoted in retail stores have
recently gone through considerable changes,
influenced in part by the growth in the
payment of slotting fees (that is, payments to
obtain space to display products and/or
promotional materials) and trade promotions
to retailers by tobacco companies. The Federal
Trade Commission reports that the tobacco
companies have been steadily increasing their
spending on these fees and promotions, with
$3.54 billion or 43% of their promotional
budget being devoted to trade promotions in
1999, up from $856 million or 33% in 1987.1
These fees and promotions take many forms
(for example, cash, rebates, free products,
display cases). They are used to encourage
retailers to create more tobacco friendly
environments containing enticing displays,
competitive prices, and visible point-of-sale
advertising.
Critics of these fees and promotions argue
that they help to create a retail environment
that stimulates an unhealthy “lift” in sales,2
with much of the increased purchases coming
from new or occasional smokers. There is par-
ticular concern that young people are being
tempted to smoke by this more tobacco
friendly environment, and some argue that the
fees and promotions encourage stores to be lax
about youth pilferage and underage sales.
This paper examines tobacco company slot-
ting fees and trade promotions, covering their
causes, eVects, and public policy options for
controlling them. The discussion is based on a
literature search of reports, web sites, journal
articles, trade press stories, and available
tobacco industry documents. In addition,
telephone interviews were conducted with five
retailers of tobacco products plus four authors
of recent reports on tobacco retailing. Further-
more, tobacco retailers in several states were
visited to observe their practices.
Recent changes in tobacco retailing
The historic emphasis in the tobacco industry
on achieving widespread, intensive, self service
distribution has changed. Vending machines
are disappearing through regulation and public
pressure.3 Further, many supermarket, drug
store (pharmacy), and convenience store
chains have made tobacco less accessible to
their customers, putting them either in locked
Plexiglas displays or in highly visible
behind-the-counter racks, giving the stores
more control over pilferage and underage buy-
ing. Other convenience stores and small “ma
and pa” retailers have also eliminated self serv-
ice displays, often because local ordinances
have required them to do so.4 And some have
eliminated self service because Philip Morris
recently instituted a policy of giving higher
payments per carton sold to stores that meet
sets of requirements, one of which is keeping
all cigarettes behind the counter in Marlboro
display cases.
Still, many convenience, “ma and pa”, and
liquor stores in certain parts of the country are
filled with self service racks and open cigarette
cartons, often near the main checkout.5
Moreover, self service flourishes in the rapidly
growing cigarettes only retailers (for example,
Cigarettes Cheaper!).6 Along with these shifts
in self service activity, the retail environment
has seen a steady upswing in the amount of
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billboards, signage, clocks, shopping baskets
and carts, and change trays that feature the
brand names and prices of cigarettes.4 7 8
Thus, the grocery and drug stores, as well as
the convenience stores that prohibit self service
displays, are not the fertile places they once
were to get established smokers to switch and
try out a new brand. They also are not as good
as they used to be for tempting young people to
initiate tobacco use. These stores, along with
the mail order and internet retailers,9 are more
likely to be catering to brand loyal, established
smokers. It is the other self service oriented,
advertising saturated, convenience, “ma and
pa,” liquor, and tobacco only stores where the
tobacco companies now see their best
opportunities for attracting new customers,
and they are reportedly targeting their sales
eVorts and promotion spending toward those
stores.10 Evidence of their interest in these
retailers can be found in the documents
submitted by the attorneys for RJ Reynolds
and the other smaller tobacco companies in
their current lawsuit challenging the alleged
exclusionary trade promotion practices of
Philip Morris.11 12
Probable causes of today’s retail
environment
A number of forces are likely to be responsible
for the current retail environment for tobacco
products. The increased regulatory and
enforcement eVorts that have been devoted to
reducing underage tobacco sales have likely
had a big impact, as larger chains and stores
have become wary of making it easy for young
people (or others) to obtain tobacco by stealing
and have therefore eliminated self service. Fur-
ther, the elimination of billboard advertising
and other selected forms of promotion (for
example, limits on sponsorships) through the
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) has
probably freed up tobacco company funds to
use to either reduce prices or spend on slotting
fees and other trade promotions.
Tobacco retailing has also probably been
heavily influenced by some evolutionary trends
in consumer goods marketing. There has been
increased emphasis on “relationship market-
ing” between manufacturers and retailers (that
is, developing partnerships to enhance eYcien-
cies) and a shift toward using “push”
marketing tools (for example, sales calls, trade
allowances, slotting fees, and display fees) over
increasingly less eVective “pull” marketing
tools (for example, media advertising).
Thus, in reaction to policy and legal
developments, as well as to shifts in the way all
consumer products are being distributed and
promoted, the tobacco companies have
developed their own new style of promoting
their products. They are employing very heavy
spending on slotting fees and trade promotion
to help create today’s retail environment for
tobacco. The slotting fees are not just being
used to obtain shelf space for new products, as
they tend to be in the grocery industry, but are
being used to achieve a variety of goals.
In working with retailers, the tobacco com-
panies seem to oVer deals that vary based on
the currency of payment and the requirements for
payment. The currencies oVered to retailers
include cash, reductions (or allowances) on
the invoices for cases sold to the retailers, free
cases, free or discounted equipment (for
example, display cases, shopping carts,
clocks), or free entertainment (for example,
NASCAR (auto racing) tickets, free vacations,
clothing). The terms buydowns (payments
made either in cash or as oV-invoice
allowances to encourage the retailer to reduce
the price of products currently held in
inventory) and rebates (payments made in cash
or as oV-invoice allowances to retailers who
have achieved certain sales volumes) are
frequently used in the industry.
The requirements the tobacco companies may
place on the retailers may contain expectations
about how certain brands will be treated in
terms of number of shelf facings, shelf heights,
locations, types of displays, self service
availability, in-store advertising, and prices.
The more requirements met by a retailer, the
greater the amount of the payments oVered.
For example, it has been reported that Philip
Morris has paid a retailer $0.30 per carton sold
from a self service display but only $0.15 per
carton sold from a non-self service display,
although the company has apparently
discontinued this practice.13 Similarly, Brown
and Williamson oVers retailers between $290
and $365 per month per store depending on
the nature of displays used.14 Indeed,
convenience stores have been reported to make
the cash equivalent of as much as $20 000 per
store per year by cooperating fully with
relationship marketing programmes (some-
times called Cooperative Merchandising
Agreements) such as Philip Morris’ Retail
Leaders Program.13 15 Interestingly, these
programmes have been a centre of controversy
in the industry, as even RJ Reynolds, the
number 2 manufacturer, has felt excluded and
harmed by the Retail Leaders Program of
Philip Morris, filing a suit along with other
manufacturers to have it discontinued.12 Simi-
larly, a programme that US Tobacco
apparently used to help it dominate retail shelf
locations for smokeless tobacco products was
found to be illegal in a jury trial in US district
court, providing Conwood Company, its
smaller competitor, with a relief award of over
$1 billion.16
Besides influencing the displays and
point-of-sale advertising in retail stores,17 the
spending on slotting fees and trade
promotions has apparently helped the tobacco
only retailers grow. It appears that Philip Mor-
ris has been extremely supportive of these spe-
cialty retailers and has oVered them attractive
partnership arrangements.6 18 Perhaps the
company sees these retailers as providing
downward pressure on all retail prices, and
they may be seen as less likely to be targets of
public criticism, since they promote
themselves as being places that prohibit entry
by minors.
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Social eVects of slotting fees and trade
promotions
Slotting fees and trade promotions could be
contributing to social problems in the USA
through several mechanisms examined below.
EFFECT ON RETAIL PRICES
Trade deals give retailers more flexibility on
pricing, allowing them to charge less for certain
brands at certain times. Trade deals have also
probably stimulated the development of the
tobacco only retailers, which have put
downward pressure on prices. At the very least,
it can be argued that trade deals create more
variation in prices over time. Perhaps this gives
tobacco consumers less of a feeling that they
need to quit to avoid an escalating financial
burden. More than likely, overall price levels on
tobacco products have also remained lower
than they might be without trade deals.
The study of post-MSA retail promotion
behaviour by Wakefield and colleagues7 found
that cents-oV promotions increased in
prevalence from 32% to 41% of the stores they
observed across the USA. Additionally,
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) data
indicate that “retail value added” spending on
oVers such as “buy one, get one free” or “buy
one and get a free lighter” grew from $1.56 bil-
lion in 1998 to $2.56 billion in 1999, account-
ing for 31.1% of the total advertising and pro-
motion spending in the industry.1 Indeed, the
MSA may have created more harm than good
when it removed billboard advertising
(reducing overtures to young people) while it
stimulated increased spending on trade deals
and value added (and thereby stimulated lower
real prices and higher consumption). In other
words, the MSA may have backfired in this
area.
EFFECT ON SELF SERVICE, PILFERAGE, AND
UNDERAGE SALES
Historically, the payments the tobacco compa-
nies have made for maintaining self service dis-
plays have been substantial. Recently, Philip
Morris has oVered retailers the same or better
trade deals if they eliminate self service—
assuming they meet other requirements (for
example, volume, behind-counter displays)—
but the other tobacco companies continue to
pay more for self service displays than clerk
controlled ones. Besides encouraging pilferage,
self service displays may create temptation for
smokers who are trying to cut down or quit or
for young people who are contemplating initia-
tion. Indeed, critics of the industry argue that
the tobacco companies give payments to retail-
ers as a way to compensate them for the losses
they incur from pilferage of self service
displays. These critics argue that the
companies see this pilferage as a way to get
young people hooked on tobacco without hav-
ing to make any illegal sales to them. To
support their arguments, the critics point to
studies that indicate that between 3.5–6.8% of
young smokers stole their cigarettes.19 They
also point to older documents from the indus-
try that seem to show that tobacco company
executives, at least in the past, recognised the
value to them of compensating retailers for pil-
ferage.8
The tobacco companies argue that instead of
trying to encourage youth pilferage they have
initiated a variety of programmes to discourage
underage sales. But the eVects of industry
sponsored programmes such as “We Card” can
be called into question based on the results of
a recent California study that found that stores
that had the industry “We Card” signs had sig-
nificantly more illegal sales then stores that had
government warning signs.20
It is also possible that the warm relationships
the tobacco company sales representatives have
formed with clerks and personnel of retailers,
through their relationship marketing pro-
grammes that provide valuable gifts to clerks,
has contributed to the clerks being a little more
lax about checking identification with young
people. However, there is no persuasive
empirical evidence on this issue.21
EFFECT ON TOBACCO FRIENDLY ENVIRONMENTS
AND YOUTH INITIATION
There can be little doubt that those retailers
who take larger amounts of slotting and
promotional dollars from the tobacco
companies have created tobacco friendlier
environments.17 What is less clear is whether
the tobacco friendlier environments, including
all of its in-store advertising, are having an
impact on the behaviour of smokers or young
people contemplating initiation. Research that
has established a strong causal link between
retail site promotional activities and consumer
behaviour has not been completed. The best
that has been done is to identify an association
between tobacco industry promotional activi-
ties and the attitudes and behaviours of young
people. For example, Voorhees and col-
leagues22 found that the more youth oriented
advertisements were displayed outside retail
stores, the more often young people tried to
buy cigarettes. Additionally, Schooler and
associates23 found that 13 year olds who
reported seeing tobacco marketing in stores
were 38% more likely to experiment with
smoking.
EFFECT ON POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM RETAILERS
By providing lucrative fees and promotions to
retailers, the tobacco companies increase the
chances that retailers will become their vocal
allies in political debates at the local, state,
national, and international level.13 The political
clout of these retailers, who are often well
organised to mount lobbying eVorts, can
potentially influence public policy decisions in
a pro-tobacco direction.
Public policy options
Three basic stances that public policy makers
could take toward slotting fees and trade
promotions in the tobacco industry are
examined below.
BANNING SLOTTING FEES AND TRADE
PROMOTIONS
There is a precedent for banning slotting fees
and similar trade deals. In 1995, they were
eliminated from the marketing of alcohol
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beverages by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms.24 This action was primarily
taken to protect small wineries and breweries
from being excluded from retail shelves
because of payments by larger rivals. However,
there was also some concern that the payments
could create too close a relationship between
alcohol beverage manufacturers and retailers,
increasing the chances for excessive promotion
of alcohol use at the point of sale.25
Banning slotting fees and trade promotions
in the tobacco industry, as has been done in the
alcohol beverage industry, could have many
benefits. Foremost, it would cut down the
pressure that retailers feel to acquiesce to the
desires of the tobacco companies and provide
low and varied prices, self service displays, and
tobacco friendly environments—or else risk
losing tobacco sales to rivals that are cooperat-
ing with the tobacco companies. A ban would
also reduce the incentives for retailers to
become close political allies with the tobacco
companies.
However, there are dangers associated with a
ban. It could allow the tobacco companies to
call a truce on trying to out-deal one another,
saving them billions of dollars in the process.
The companies could then use these savings to
cut the price dramatically on tobacco products
and this could lead to more tobacco sales than
might be the case if the trade deals were
allowed to continue.
ATTEMPTING TO MITIGATE HARMS
Assuming slotting fees and trade promotions
are not banned, there are a number of other
steps that public policy makers could take to
try to mitigate the harms caused by these tools.
First, minimum resale prices could be set on
tobacco products, which could eliminate the
demand stimulation that slotting fees and trade
promotions can accomplish through their role
in encouraging lower retail prices. In New York
state, it is unlawful for retailers to sell below
cost plus a statutorily determined minimum
percentage markup. In calculating cost, the
state does not allow the deduction of slotting
fees or trade allowances, preventing the passing
on of these types of discounts to consumers.
For the most part, this is done to ensure that
the state gets its full share of tobacco sales tax
revenues, but it could be having the secondary
eVect of mitigating the harmful eVects of slot-
ting fees and trade promotions.
Another approach could involve the banning
of self service displays, which has already been
done in many communities. Indeed, a ban on
self service displays coupled with strict
enforcement of age identification checks could
do much to minimise the harms created by
trade deals. However, such a policy approach
would be consistent with Philip Morris’
current strategy of discouraging self service
and encouraging participation in the “We
Card” programme. Perhaps it is doing this
because it knows its strong, well established
brands will benefit from limiting the
competitive options of its rivals.
Another step that could be taken is
mandatory licensing of tobacco retailers, which
has been implemented in many communities.
Fear of losing a very profitable licence to sell
tobacco would increase the incentives for the
retailer to police underage sales very
vigorously, regardless of trade deal activity.
Although enforcement expenses would arise,
these could be covered by the license fees.
Moreover, stores might respond to these fees
by choosing not to carry tobacco products or
raising prices, reducing tobacco availability to
many and potentially reducing consumption.
Naturally, retailers can be expected to organise
politically against licensing.
Requiring retailers to post larger and more
numerous signs about the consequences of
selling tobacco to young people is another
option. At a minimum, attempts could be
made to ensure that warning signs are not
removed, which one study found happened in
stores that received trade deals.26. A Stanford
study found that stores that never sold to
minors in a youth purchase survey in one com-
munity had nearly twice as many age of sale
signs on or within 4 feet (1.2 m) of the counter
area.21 Of course, the type of sign and the man-
ner in which it is oVered to the retailer may
impact its eVectiveness. As discussed earlier,
stores that had the “We Card” signs from the
industry sponsored programme actually had
more illegal sales than stores that had
government created signs.20 This may have
happened because participation in the “We
Card” programme may have led retail clerks to
be more relaxed about checking identification.
Or the “We Card” signs, which are typically
located near the counter, may be getting lost in
all the clutter in that area and may have also
become too familiar.
Self service bans and vigorous identification
checking would not prevent the huge volume of
in-store, front window, and parking lot
advertising from continuing. To the extent that
former smokers may be influenced by these
messages to relapse or that children may be
influenced to initiate smoking, then it might be
tempting to try to restrict some or all of these
forms of promotion. This could include a ban
on outdoor advertising of tobacco products by
retailers, which is something that was not
banned by the MSA.
A problem with restricting point-of-sale pro-
motional materials is figuring out which
restrictions would be viewed as infringements
on First Amendment free speech rights and
which would not? The courts would certainly
weigh in on this matter, as they already have in
a case involving advertising restrictions in
Massachusetts. Furthermore, in the past, the
tobacco companies have shown great ingenuity
in finding new ways to overcome having limits
put on their promotional eVorts.7 27 Moreover,
there is also the risk that they would use the
funds saved to just lower their prices.
RELY ON ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING STATUTES
AND MARKET FORCES
The option exists to do nothing special about
slotting fees and trade promotions, hoping that
a certain amount of the problems created will
resolve themselves as the public becomes more
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informed and wary about retail tobacco
promotions, as enforcement of existing youth
access laws increases, and as market forces
continue to play out. In this latter category, it is
conceivable that the growth of the tobacco only
retailers could make the tobacco promotion
practices of other types of retail stores relatively
unimportant. However, it is unlikely that the
tobacco companies would allow the tobacco
only retailers to become dominant, since they
need the other retailers to help them entice
new smokers. The tobacco only stores are
unlikely to attract much non-smoker traYc,
especially since they purportedly prohibit entry
by minors.
Conclusions
Before taking any strong actions against
slotting fees and trade promotions, it would be
helpful for public policy makers to have
additional information. It would be particu-
larly useful to have a better grasp on how retail
prices have been aVected by the recent policy
actions and the resulting increase in trade-deal
activity. If prices are lower than they might
have been had billboard advertising not been
banned (and only fines imposed) by the MSA,
then it might suggest that additional bans on
trade deals or in-store promotional materials
could backfire and lead to demand stimulating
price cuts by the tobacco companies.
Of course, any demand stimulation created by
lower prices might be worth tolerating if fewer
tobacco friendly retail environments were
created, with a lot fewer young people being
influenced by these environments to initiate or
continue smoking. Therefore, it is important for
research to be done on how young people
respond to tobacco friendly retail environments
that are filled with promotional materials and
few warning signs. There is some evidence that
more tobacco friendly environments are associ-
ated with higher numbers of youth purchase
attempts22 and higher likelihood of youths
experimenting with smoking.23 But it is unclear
whether the environments have caused the
reported smoking behaviours or whether the
tobacco companies and retailers have set up
more tobacco friendly stores in markets that are
more likely to have young people making
purchase attempts and intending to smoke. Bet-
ter evidence on the direction of causality is
needed.
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What this paper adds
A variety of web sites, reports, and research
studies have suggested that slotting fees and
trade promotions oVered by the tobacco
companies are responsible for creating a
retail environment that stimulates an
unhealthy “lift” in tobacco sales, with much
of the increased purchases coming from
new or occasional smokers. There is
particular concern that young people are
being tempted to smoke by this more
tobacco friendly environment filled with
advertising and eye catching displays, and
some argue that the fees and promotions
encourage stores to be lax about youth
pilferage and underage sales.
In this article, the previous work on
tobacco industry slotting fees and trade
promotions is synthesised, evaluated, and
supplemented. Additional potential nega-
tive eVects of the fees and promotions, such
as creating lower and more varied prices, are
identified. Moreover, public policy options,
such as eliminating these fees and
promotions or seeking to mitigate their
eVects through requirements like retail
licensing or bans on self service displays, are
critically assessed.
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